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OPTIMAL RISK SHARING UNDER DISTORTED PROBABILITIES
MICHAEL LUDKOVSKI† AND VIRGINIA R. YOUNG
Abstract. We study optimal risk sharing among n agents endowed with distortion risk
measures. Our model includes market frictions that can either represent linear transaction
costs or risk premia charged by a clearing house for the agents. Risk sharing under third-
party constraints is also considered. We obtain an explicit formula for Pareto optimal
allocations. In particular, we find that a stop-loss or deductible risk sharing is optimal in
the case of two agents and several common distortion functions. This extends recent result
of Jouini et al. (2006) to the problem with unbounded risks and market frictions.
1. Introduction
Many financial problems involve transfer of risk among agents. Two noteworthy examples
are insurance markets and the general equilibrium theory of stock prices. In such problems,
n ≥ 2 agents with risky endowments (or loss exposures) Xi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are interested
in devising an optimal re-allocation of their risks. Let X ,
∑n
i=1Xi be the total exposure of
the n agents, and let Vi be the subjective valuation (preference) functional of the i-th agent.
Consider the collection of allocations of the loss X, namely
A(X) , {Y := (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) : X =
n∑
i=1
Yi, Vi(Yi) finite}.
The risk sharing problem consists in finding an optimal allocation Y∗ ∈ A(X), namely an
allocation such that (i) Y∗ is Pareto optimal, that is, no agent can be made strictly better
off without another agent being made strictly worse off; and (ii) Y∗ satisfies a rationality
constraint, that is, all agents are at least as well off under Y∗ as under the initial exposures
X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). The latter feasibility constraint is motivated by the assumption that
only an irrational agent would enter into a contract that made the agent (strictly) worse off.
The key ingredient in the above problem are the preference functionals Vi, and accordingly
the optimal risk sharing literature has evolved as new theories of risk have been developed.
Pioneering work was carried out in the 1960s by Borch [7] and Arrow [3] who showed that
deductible insurance is optimal under concave risk preferences, specifically, when Vi are
represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Later research studied the case
of the dual theory of risk of Yaari [40] and Choquet expected utility theory [12]. Very
recently, research has focused on risk preferences given in terms of convex risk measures [18].
In particular, Barrieu and El Karoui [4] studied optimal risk sharing under the exponential
indifference measure, while Jouini et al. [25] analyzed the case of two agents and convex,
law-invariant risk measures. The related question of market equilibrium was addressed in [2],
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[11] and [17]. On a more abstract level, Ludkovski and Ru¨schendorf [28] show that Pareto
optimal allocations are comonotone if the risk measures preserve the convex order. The latter
structural result allows for some explicit computations, as it permits direct representation
of possible allocations through the pooling functions.
A simultaneous strand of the literature has been addressing extensions of the basic in-
surance problem that take into account market frictions. For example, the fundamental
problem of adverse selection was initiated by Rothschild and Stiglitz [34] and later further
discussed in [40]. The effect of transaction costs on optimal contracts was first considered by
Raviv [30]. Other possible externalities are summarized in the survey articles of Gerber [19]
and Aase [1]. Many markets also impose constraints on possible risk transfers. Often, only a
limited set of risk instruments is a priori given, so that risk sharing must belong to the span
of available contracts (as studied by Filipovic and Kupper [16]). Alternatively, the amount
of risk transfer is limited by regulator authorities; for instance in the classical insurance
problem the insurer may be able to take on only part of the total risk due to risk capital
regulations. The latter problem, which we call risk sharing under constraints, introduces
effectively n + 1 players into the model, namely n original participants, plus the additional
regulator that imposes limits on allowable risk exposures of each participant. The special
case of Value-at-Risk constraints was recently analyzed in Bernard and Tian [6].
This article extends previous results in these two directions by studying optimal risk
sharing in the context of distortion risk measures, transaction costs and/or third-party con-
straints. Distortion risk measures lie at the junction of actuarial and financial applications,
being related both to the dual theory of risk and coherent risk measures. The transaction
costs in our model have a dual nature and can either represent genuine transaction fees aris-
ing due to verification, accounting and other inter-agent costs, or the risk-loaded premium
charged by the insurer. For the constraints, we consider a general set of restrictions given in
terms of distortion risk measures.
Our main result, namely Theorem 3, shows that in all of the above cases, the optimal
risk allocation consists of a collection or “ladder” of deductible contracts. This result can be
interpreted as an economic justification for the tranche contracts one observes in practice, in
particular, in credit and reinsurance markets. Moreover, using the quantile representation of
distortion risk measures we are able to explicitly characterize Pareto optimal contracts under
transaction costs and/or constraints. In turn, this allows us to present several completely
worked-out examples of optimal risk sharing under some common risk measures, such as
Average Value-at-Risk.
In terms of related literature, Theorem 3 is an extension of the results of Jouini et al. [25]
to the multi-agent case with transaction costs and constraints. Compared to their abstract
approach based on convex duality an inf-convolution, our method is more elementary and
direct and provides a clearer insight into the problem structure. On a more general note, this
paper aims to underscore the usefulness of distortion risk measures that have been arguably
under-appreciated by the financial/mathematical economics community [14]. In contrast to
the classical expected utility theory, this new framework is driven by two factors. First, it
postulates cash-equivariant preferences that are appealing based on the normative observa-
tion that guaranteed cash payments should not affect risk attitudes. Secondly, distortion risk
measures attempt to mirror business practices where various Value-at-Risk (VaR) method-
ologies have emerged as the tool of choice. In particular, Average Value-at-Risk (AVaR)
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has been gaining practitioner acceptance and also happens to be a canonical example of our
model.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we define the setting in which the n agents
seek a Pareto optimal risk exchange. In Section 3, we obtain the class of Pareto optimal risk
exchanges in our model. This is then generalized to the constrained setting in Section 4. We
focus on the case of two agents in Section 5, while interpreting one agent as an insurer and
another as a buyer of insurance. In this simplified setup we present fully solved examples,
including examples with explicitly computable deductibles. In Section 6, we provide another
illustration of our results by considering a single-agent minimization by a buyer of insurance
who faces a regulator constraint on the possible indemnity contracts. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. Model for Risk Sharing
2.1. Distorted Probabilities. Consider the collection of a.s.-finite random variables P =
{Y : P[−∞ < Y <∞] = 1} on a probability space (Ω,F ,P). As usual, we denote by L∞ ⊂ P
(L1 ⊂ P) the collection of all a.s. bounded (respectively integrable) random variables.
Definition 1. Two random variables Y and Z ∈ P are said to be comonotone if
(Y (ω1)− Y (ω2))(Z(ω1)− Z(ω2)) ≥ 0, (1)
P(dω1)× P(dω2)-almost surely. In other words, Y and Z move together.
An equivalent definition of comonotonicity is that there exists a random variable V ∈ P
and non-decreasing functions fY and fZ such that Y = fY (V ) and Z = fZ(V ) almost surely
[15]. Another equivalent definition is that there exist non-decreasing functions hY and hZ
such that hY (x) + hZ(x) = x, Y = hY (Y + Z), and Z = hZ(Y + Z) almost surely.
Definition 2. A function H : P → R is called a law-invariant, comonotone, monetary risk
measure (or distortion risk measure) if H satisfies the following five properties:
(a) H(Y ) depends only on the law of Y ∈ P.
(b) H is monotone in the natural order of P.
(c) H is cash equivariant: H(Y + a) = H(Y ) + a for any a ∈ R.
(d) H is subadditive in general and additive for comonotone risks: For Y, Z ∈ P,
H(Y + Z) ≤ H(Y ) +H(Z), (2)
with equality for any Y, Z comonotone.
(e) H is continuous: For Y ∈ P,
lim
d→−∞
H[max(Y, d)] = H(Y ), (3a)
lim
d→0+
H[max(Y − d, 0)] = H(Y ), if Y ≥ 0, (3b)
lim
d→∞
H[min(Y, d)] = H(Y ). (3c)
The above axioms are justified by basic economic principles as applied to insurance; see
[14, 25, 38]. Because we are interested in risk sharing, cash equivariance is a desirable
property because receiving fixed payments (at least within a reasonable range) should not
affect attitudes towards risk. The comonotone additivity property represents inability to
diversify risks that always move in the same direction. The continuity property (e) is for
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technical reasons, although it was shown by [24] that viewing H as a map on L∞(P), (e) is
automatically implied by (a)-(d).
Denote by SY the (decumulative) distribution function of Y , that is, SY (t) = P(Y > t),
and by S−1Y the (pseudo-)inverse of SY , which is unique up to a countable set [15]. For
concreteness, take S−1Y (p) = sup{t : SY (t) > p}. The inverse S−1Y thus defined is right
continuous; if one were to desire left continuity, then replace > with ≥.
We recall that any distortion risk measure admits the following representation, which
essentially follows from Greco’s representation theorem [21]:
Theorem 1. ([15], [38, Appendix A]) Let H be a distortion risk measure. Then, there exists
a non-decreasing, concave function g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1, and
H(Y ) =
∫
Y d(g ◦ P) =
∫ 1
0
S−1Y (p) dg(p) (4)
=
∫ 0
−∞
(g[SY (t)]− 1) dt+
∫ ∞
0
g[SY (t)] dt, ∀Y ∈ P .
We write Hg for H when we want to specify the particular function g in (4). The function
g is called a distortion because it modifies, or distorts, the tail probability SY . Observe if
g(p) = p, then Hg(Y ) = EY . For this reason, Hg is also referred to as an expectation with
respect to a distorted probability. Note that at this stage we allow Hg to take ±∞ as a
value.
We assume that each agent orders random variables in P by using a distortion risk measure
Hg, where Y is preferred to (that is, less risky than) Z by the agent if Hg(Y ) ≤ Hg(Z), and
we pursue this topic in the next section. For more background on such risk measures Hg,
see Yaari [39] who discusses evaluating random variables in a theory of risk that is dual to
expected utility. Two noteworthy examples of distortion risk measures are (1) the Average
Value-at-Risk at level 1− α−1 (AVaR) obtained by taking g(p) = min(αp, 1) for some α > 1
and (2) the proportional hazards transform g(p) = pc for some 0 < c < 1.
Remark 1. It has been shown [13, 26] that any distortion risk measure is a weighted average
of the AVaR. Namely, define AV aRα(Y ) as above. Then, any comonotone law-invariant
coherent risk measure on P can be written as
H(Y ) =
∫ 1
0
AV aRα(Y )µ(dα),
for some probability measure µ on [0, 1]. For this reason, [13] calls a distortion risk measure
Weighted VaR.
Remark 2. Since a distortion risk measure is a special case of a coherent risk measure, one can
also obtain a representation of H in terms of penalized expectations, H(Y ) = supQ∈D EQ[Y ],
for the set D of probability measures called the core of g ◦ P, and Y ∈ L1 [15, Proposition
10.3]. For more results in this direction see [18].
Definition 3. Y is said to precede (or be preferred to) Z in convex order if
∫ q
0
S−1Y (p) dp ≤∫ q
0
S−1Z (p) dp for all q ∈ [0, 1] with equality at q = 1. We write Y ≤cx Z.
Note that convex order is equivalent to ordering with respect to second stochastic dom-
inance with equal means [31, 32, 33]. For later use, recall that Hg satisfies the following
properties for Y ∈ P (see [37]):
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(a) Positive homogeneity: If a ≥ 0, then Hg(aY ) = aHg(Y ). Note that positive ho-
mogeneity and subadditivity imply that H is convex, that is, H(λY + (1 − λ)Z) ≤
λH(Y ) + (1− λ)H(Z) for all λ ∈ (0, 1).
(b) Duality: Hg(−Y ) = −Hg˜(Y ), in which g˜ is the dual distortion of g given by g˜(p) =
1−g(1−p) for p ∈ [0, 1]. Since g is concave, g˜ is convex. The dual Hg˜ can be thought
of as a monetary utility function that measures attitudes towards wealth levels; see
[24].
(c) Convex ordering: Because g is concave, Hg preserves ≤cx, that is, if Y ≤cx Z then
Hg(Y ) ≤ Hg(Z). In particular, because EY ≤cx Y , then EY = Hg(EY ) ≤ Hg(Y ).
(d) Non-excessive loading: H(Y ) ≤ ess supY .
2.2. Economic Objective. Suppose agent i faces a random lossXi before any risk exchange
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If the collection of agents trades the original allocation X for the allocation
Y ∈ A(X), then the random loss or payout, including transaction costs, of agent i becomes
Zi = Yi + (ai + biYi + ciEYi) = (1 + bi)Yi + ai + ciEYi. (5)
The additive factor ai ≥ 0 is a fixed cost associated with transferring the risk Xi to the
coalition of agents (or to a central clearing house); for example, ai could be the premium
that the agent pays to the coalition to eliminate the risk Xi. The multiplicative factor
bi ≥ 0 represents costs associated with the actual size of the random loss Yi, for example,
investigative costs that could increase proportionally with the size of the loss. The factor
ci ∈ R represents costs that reflect the expected size of the payout Yi, for example, hiring
claim administrators; ci is also net of any premium that the agent receives in exchange for
accepting the risk Yi, if the premium equals (1 + θ)EYi as in [3]. In fact, we might wish to
say that ci = −(1 + θ), that is, all of this part of the cost function arises from premium
received. We explore this in examples later in the paper, as well as at the end of this section.
Agent i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, seeks to minimize Hgi(Zi) for some concave distortion function
gi. Note that minimizing
Hgi(Zi) = Hgi((1 + bi)Yi + ai + ciEYi) = (1 + bi)Hgi(Yi) + ai + ciEYi (6)
is equivalent to minimizing
Vi(Yi) := (1 + bi)Hgi(Yi) + ciEYi. (7)
In light of this recasting of agent i’s goal, a Pareto optimal risk exchange is defined as
follows:
Definition 4. X∗ ∈ A(X) is called a Pareto optimal risk exchange or allocation if whenever
there exists an allocation Y ∈ A(X) such that Vi(Yi) ≤ Vi(X∗i ) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then
Vi(Yi) = Vi(X
∗
i ) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In other words, there is no way to make any agent (strictly) better off without making
another agent (strictly) worse off.
We assume that the initial allocation carries finite risk, that is, Hgi(Xi) is finite for i =
1, 2, . . . , n. Therefore, there exists at least one allocation Y, namely X itself, such that Vi(Yi)
is finite for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
We end this section by discussing the rationality constraint mentioned in the Introduction.
In order that the allocation Y ∈ A(X) be feasible (regardless of whether it is Pareto optimal),
it must be true that each agent is at least as well off under Y as under the original allocation
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X. That is, the following inequality must hold for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n: Hgi(Xi) ≥ Vi(Yi).
We assume that the set of feasible allocations in A(X) is non-empty.
When first presenting the cost function ai+biYi+ciEYi in connection with equation (5), we
proposed that one might wish to consider the last term as representing premium received in
exchange for accepting the risk Yi. In that case, write the premium as −ciEYi = (1 + θ)EYi,
so that the rationality constraint becomes
(1 + θ)EYi ≥ ai + (1 + bi)Hgi(Yi)−Hgi(Xi). (8)
One can interpret the left-hand side of inequality (8) as the minimum premium that agent
i is willing to accept for replacing Xi with Yi. Therefore, the rationality constraint holds in
this case if the premium received is at least as great as the risk-adjusted cost, as measured
by the right-hand side of (8).
3. Pareto Optimal Allocations
To describe the Pareto optimal allocations, we begin with a series of lemmas. In the first
lemma, we show that if the 1 + bi + ci’s are of different signs or if one of them is zero and
the other is non-zero, then no Pareto optimal allocation exists.
Lemma 1. Suppose there exist i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n such that 1+ bi+ ci 6= 0 and (1+ bi+ ci)(1+
bj + cj) ≤ 0, then no Pareto optimal allocation in A(X) exists.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that 1 + b1 + c1 < 0 and 1 + b2 + c2 ≥ 0. Consider
any Y ∈ A(X). Then, Z = (Y1 + 1, Y2− 1, Y3, . . . , Yn) is a strict improvement on Y because
V1(Z1) = V1(Y1) + (1 + b1 + c1) < V1(Y1) and V2(Z2) = V2(Y2)− (1 + b2 + c2) ≤ V2(Y2). Thus,
there exists no Pareto optimal allocation in A(X).  
For the present, we skip the case in which all 1 + bi + ci = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n; we consider
it more fully for the case of n = 2 in Section 5. The next lemma is straightforward, but we
include its proof for completeness.
Lemma 2. If X∗ = (X∗1 , X
∗
2 , . . . , X
∗
n) ∈ A(X) is Pareto optimal, then so is (X∗1 , X∗2 , . . . , X∗j +
β, . . . , X∗k − β, . . . , X∗n) ∈ A(X) for any β ∈ R and any j, k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof. Let X∗ = (X∗1 , X
∗
2 , . . . , X
∗
n) ∈ A(X) be Pareto optimal. Suppose Y ∈ A(X) is such
that Vj(Yj) ≤ Vj(X∗j + β), Vk(Yk) ≤ Vk(X∗k − β), and Vi(Yi) ≤ Vi(X∗i ) for i 6= j, k. We
want to show that equality holds in each case. Inequality Vj(Yj) ≤ Vj(X∗j + β) implies that
Vj(Yj) ≤ Vj(X∗j ) + (1 + bj + cj)β, from which it follows that Vj(Yj − β) ≤ Vj(X∗j ). Similarly,
Vk(Yk) ≤ Vk(X∗k − β) implies that Vk(Yk + β) ≤ Vk(X∗k). Note that the allocation Y′ defined
by Y ′j = Yj − β, Y ′k = Yk + β, and Y ′i = Yi for i 6= j, k is in A(X). Therefore, by the Pareto
optimality of X∗ we have Vj(Yj − β) = Vj(X∗j ), Vk(Yk + β) = Vk(X∗k), and Vi(Yi) = Vi(X∗i )
for i 6= j, k, from which it follows that Vj(Yj) = Vj(X∗j + β), Vk(Yk) = Vk(X∗k − β), and
Vi(Yi) = Vi(X
∗
i ) for i 6= j, k. Hence, (X∗1 , X∗2 , . . . , X∗j + β, . . . , X∗k − β, . . . , X∗n) is Pareto
optimal.  
It follows from Lemma 2 that without loss of generality, we can assume that a Pareto
optimal allocation assigns the loss 0 to each of the n agents when the total loss X is 0.
If this particular Pareto optimal allocation does not satisfy the rationality constraint in
inequality (8), then we can modify the allocation by constants (that sum to zero) so that the
rationality constraint is satisfied. (Recall that we assume that the set of feasible allocations
is non-empty, so there exist such constants.)
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Consider the mapping F : A(X)→ Rn given by F (Y) = (V1(Y1), V2(Y2), . . . , Vn(Yn)). We
can partially order the points in Rn as follows:
Definition 5. For x,y ∈ Rn, we write x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The next lemma, whose proof is immediate from the definition of Pareto optimality in
Definition 4, shows that the Pareto optimal points in A(X) correspond to the minimal
points in the image of F in Rn.
Lemma 3. If X∗ ∈ A(X) is Pareto optimal, then F (X∗) ∈ im(F ) is minimal. Conversely,
if x ∈ im(F ) is minimal, then there exists X∗ ∈ A(X) with F (X∗) = x, such that X∗ is a
Pareto optimal allocation.
We next use Lemmas 2 and 3 to characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations when
we view them as points in Rn via the mapping F .
Theorem 2. Suppose (1 + bi + ci)(1 + bj + cj) > 0 for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, the image
of the set of Pareto optimal allocations in A(X) under the mapping F is a hyperplane in Rn
given by {
x ∈ Rn :
n∑
i=1
(Vi(X
∗
i )− xi)/ (1 + bi + ci) = 0
}
, (9)
in which X∗ ∈ A(X) is any Pareto optimal allocation. Furthermore, one obtains such a
Pareto optimal allocation X∗ by minimizing
n∑
i=1
Vi(Yi)/
∣∣1 + bi + ci∣∣ (10)
over Y ∈ A(X).
Proof. We begin by showing that if X∗ ∈ A(X) minimizes the expression in (10), then X∗
is Pareto optimal. Suppose that Y ∈ A(X) is such that Vi(Yi) ≤ Vi(X∗i ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then,
∑n
i=1 Vi(Yi)/
∣∣1 + bi + ci∣∣ ≤ ∑ni=1 Vi(X∗i )/∣∣1 + bi + ci∣∣, from which it follows that∑n
i=1 Vi(Yi)/
∣∣1 + bi + ci∣∣ = ∑ni=1 Vi(X∗i )/∣∣1 + bi + ci∣∣ because X∗ minimizes (10). Therefore,
Vi(Yi) = Vi(X
∗
i ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and X
∗ is Pareto optimal.
Next, suppose x ∈ Rn satisfies the equation of the hyperplane (9) for some Pareto optimal
allocation X∗ ∈ A(X). Define βi := (xi − Vi(X∗i ))/(1 + bi + ci) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n; then,∑n
i=1 βi = 0. Define Xˆ
∗ := (X∗1 + β1, X
∗
2 + β2, . . . , X
∗
n + βn) ∈ A(X). By the same argument
as in the proof of Lemma 2, one can show that Xˆ∗ is Pareto optimal. Finally, F (Xˆ∗) =
(V1(X
∗
1+β1), V2(X
∗
2+β2), . . . , Vn(X
∗
n+βn)) = F (X
∗)+(β1(1+b1+c1), β2(1+b2+c2), . . . , βn(1+
bn + cn)) = F (X
∗) + (x1 − V1(X∗1 ), x2 − V2(X∗2 ), . . . , xn − Vn(X∗n)) = x. Thus, (any) x in (9)
is an image of a Pareto optimal allocation in A(X) via the mapping F . As an aside, note
that all elements of the hyperplane (9) give the same minimum value in the expression (10).
To complete the proof, we need to show that the hyperplane (9) gives us all the Pareto
optimal allocations. Suppose not; suppose that there is a Pareto optimal allocation Y∗ ∈
A(X) that is mapped to a point not on the hyperplane (9). Then, by the argument in
the above paragraph, any point y ∈ Rn that satisfies ∑ni=1(Vi(Y ∗i ) − yi)/ (1 + bi + ci) = 0
is the image of a Pareto optimal allocation. Thus, we have two parallel hyperplanes both
purporting to be the image (under the mapping F ) of Pareto optimal allocations in A(X).
By Lemma 3, only one of these hyperplanes will be minimal, a contradiction. Thus, the
Pareto optimal allocations in A(X) correspond to points in the hyperplane (9).  
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To describe Pareto optimal allocations corresponding to points in the hyperplane (9), it
is easier to consider comonotone allocations.
Definition 6. An allocation Y ∈ A(X) is called comonotone if Yi and X are comonotone
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Note that if Y is a comonotone allocation then any two Yi and Yj are also pairwise
comonotone. Ludkovski and Ru¨schendorf [28, Proposition 1] shows that for Vi preserving the
convex order, any integrable non-comonotone allocation X ∈ A(X), Xi ∈ L1(P) is dominated
by some comonotone X∗, Vi(X∗i ) ≤ Vi(Xi), i = 1, 2, . . . , n. This result is essentially based
on the comonotone ≤cx-improvement result of Landsberger and Meilijson [27]. Note that
the requirement Xi ∈ L1 is automatically satisfied since we already assume that EXi ≤
Hgi(Xi) <∞. Thus, Pareto optimal allocations are comonotone.
For a comonotone allocation X = (f1(X), f2(X), . . . , fn(X)), Denneberg [15, Proposition
4.5] shows that the functions fi are continuous on supp(X) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Moreover,
he shows that fi may be extended to continuous functions on the entire real line such that∑n
i=1 fi(x) = x for all x ∈ R. It follows that we can restrict our attention to finding Pareto
optimal allocations in
C(X) , {(f1(X), f2(X), . . . , fn(X)) ∈ A(X) :
fi cont., non-decreasing,
n∑
i=1
fi(x) = x for x ∈ R}. (11)
Comonotonicity implies that an optimal risk allocation necessarily satisfies the mutuality
principle, whereby the share of each agent depends only on the total risk X. We now use
the above results to explicitly characterize the Pareto optimal allocations.
Theorem 3. Suppose (1 + bi + ci)(1 + bj + cj) > 0 for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Then, X
∗ =
(f ∗1 (X), f
∗
2 (X), . . . , f
∗
n(X)) ∈ C(X) is a Pareto optimal allocation if and only if∑
i∈I
(f ∗i )
′(t) = 1 for I = argmink=1,2,...,n
(1 + bk)gk(SX(t)) + ckSX(t)∣∣1 + bk + ck∣∣ , (12)
and (f ∗i )
′(t) = 0 otherwise.
Proof. From Theorem 2 and [28], we know that Pareto optimal allocations correspond to min-
imizers X∗ ∈ C(X) of the expression in (10). As discussed after the proof of Lemma 2 without
loss of generality, suppose that the Pareto optimal allocation X∗ = (f ∗1 (X), f
∗
2 (X), . . . , f
∗
n(X))
is such that f ∗i (0) = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Suppose Y = f(X) for a continuous, non-decreasing real-valued function f on R+ with
f(0) = 0; then,
(1 + b)Hg(Y ) + cEY = (1 + b)
∫ 1
0
S−1f(X)(p) dg(p) + c
∫ 1
0
S−1f(X)(p) d(p)
= (1 + b)
∫ 1
0
f
[
S−1X (p)
]
dg(p) + c
∫ 1
0
f
[
S−1X (p)
]
d(p)
= (1 + b)
∫ ∞
0
g [SX(t)] df(t) + c
∫ ∞
0
SX(t) df(t)
=
∫ ∞
0
[(1 + b)g + c] (SX(t)) df(t),
(13)
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in which the function (1 + b)g + c is defined on [0, 1] by [(1 + b)g + c](p) = (1 + b)g(p) + cp.
Thus, minimizing expression (10) is equivalent to minimizing
n∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
[(1 + bi)gi + ci] (SX(t))∣∣1 + bi + ci∣∣ dfi(t), (14)
which is minimized by setting
∑
i∈I(f
∗
i )
′(t) = 1 for
I = argmink=1,2,...,n {(1 + bk)gk(SX(t)) + ckSX(t)} /
∣∣1 + bk + ck∣∣, and by setting (f ∗i )′(t) = 0
otherwise.  
The above theorem implies that under a Pareto optimal allocation, the risk sharing consists
of “tranches” where the risk of each tranche is entirely borne by one agent (ignoring equality
in the argmin). As expression (12) shows, the optimal allocation Y ∗i of the i-th agent consists
of a series of laddered European options on the total risk X. Hence, agent i assumes total
responsibility for risk levels where f ∗i (S
−1
X (t)) = 1, and receives full insurance otherwise. Such
risk sharing arrangements are observed in practice in credit derivatives, where the total risk
X represents a bond portfolio subject to default risk and the corresponding risk is allocated
via credit tranches. These credit tranches can be viewed as optimal insurance contracts for
a set of representative investors with varying risk measures.
Remark 3. The problem considered in this section has a long history in the context of
reinsurers determining the best way to allocate risk among them. Borch [7] shows that
if the reinsurers seek to maximize their expected utility of wealth, then the allocation is
related to their absolute risk aversions, in which the absolute risk aversion associated with a
utility function u is −u′′/u′. Bu¨hlmann [8, 9] extends Borch’s work by developing premium
rules associated with such risk sharing. The connection between second order stochastic
dominance and optimality of deductible insurance was already noted in [23] and [20].
Remark 4. Theorem 2 and the reduction to comonotone allocations are key steps in our
argument since they dramatically simplify the structure of Pareto optimal allocations. Note
that the only property used in the proof of Theorem 2 was the cash equivariance of the
corresponding risk measures, while the only property used in relation to the comonotonicity
improvement of Proposition 1 in Ludkovski and Ru¨schendorf [28] was consistency of H and
≤cx. On the other hand, Ba¨uerle and Mu¨ller [5] show that any law-invariant convex risk
measure, subject to a mild continuity requirement, is consistent with the convex order ≤cx.
We, therefore, hypothesize that the conclusion of Theorem 3 will hold for arbitrary law-
invariant convex risk measures. This conjecture would further extend the setting of Jouini
et al. [25].
4. Constrained Risk Sharing
We next consider the related situation for which the risk sharing is subject to regulation.
This may arise, for example, in an insurance setting where the risk transfer from buyer to
insurer is controlled by a government regulator, or in a financial setting where the party
taking on risk is subject to a risk management framework, such as Basel II.
The effect of such regulation is to impose further constraints upon some of the Yi’s in (10).
This of course modifies the resulting Pareto optimal allocations since some of the possible
optima become infeasible under the constraint. A similar model was studied by Bernard and
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Tian [6] under the assumption of a VaR constraint. In our framework where we work with
distortion risk measures, we instead postulate constraints of the form
Hhi(Yi) ≤ Bi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
in which Hhi is the regulator’s (convex) risk measure on the final risk transfer amount Yi,
and Bi is the corresponding risk threshold for agent i.
We modify the set of allocations A(X) to account for these constraints. Define the set of
constrained allocations by
Ac(X) , {Y := (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) : X =
n∑
i=1
Yi, Vi(Yi) finite, Hhi(Yi) ≤ Bi}.
We assume that the set of feasible allocations in Ac(X) is non-empty. Analogous to Defini-
tion 4, X∗ ∈ Ac(X) is a constrained Pareto optimal allocation if whenever there exists an
allocation Y ∈ Ac(X) such that Vi(Yi) ≤ Vi(X∗i ) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then Vi(Yi) = Vi(X∗i )
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The next lemma shows that as in Section 3 for unconstrained Pareto optimal allocations,
without loss of generality we can restrict our attention to constrained Pareto optimal allo-
cations that are comonotone.
Lemma 4. If Y ∈ Ac(X), then there exists Y′ ∈ C(X) ∩ Ac(X) that improves it in the
partial ordering of Section 3.
Proof. Ludkovski and Ru¨schendorf [28, Proposition 1] show that given an arbitrary allocation
Y ∈ Ac(X) ⊂ A(X), there is a comonotone improvement in the stochastic convex order
Y′ ∈ C(X), that is, Y ′i ≤cx Yi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Therefore, the allocation Y′ improves Y
in the partial ordering of Section 3 because Vi preserves the convex order for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Moreover, because Hhi also preserves the convex order, it follows that Hhi(Y
′
i ) ≤ Hhi(Yi) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and Y′ ∈ Ac(X) is still feasible. Thus, Y′ ∈ C(X) ∩ Ac(X).  
Note that if the constraining risk measure is not convex, then optimal allocations might
not be comonotone. For instance, a VaR constraint at level α% corresponds to the non-
concave distortion function h(p) = 1{p>α}. Such Hh is not consistent with the ≤cx-order,
and therefore Lemma 4 does not apply. Indeed, as explicitly shown by Bernard and Tian [6],
the resulting optimal allocation might fail to be comonotone.
By using Lemma 4, we reduce the constrained problem to the same situation as in Theorem
3.
Theorem 4. The optimal risk allocation for the constrained problem is obtained by finding
minimizers of
n∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
[(1 + bi)gi + λihi + ci] (SX(t))∣∣1 + bi + ci + λi∣∣ dfi(t), (15)
in which λi ≥ 0 is a Lagrange multiplier for the i-th constraint, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
It follows from Theorem 4, that we, again, will obtain a ladder-like optimal contract structure,
similar to the tranches in (14). Many cases are possible with respect to which of the λi’s
are positive (that is, the respective constraint binds) versus zero. In particular, a variety of
degeneracies might arise if several constraints bind simultaneously. Instead of considering
all these cases for an arbitrary n, in Sections 5.3 and 6 we focus on a simple example with
two agents and one constraint, a setting already taken up in [6].
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5. The Special Case of n = 2 Agents
In this section, we specialize our results to the case for which we have two agents. Suppose
an individual (agent 2) is facing an insurable random loss X2 = X and wants to buy insurance
f(X) for all or part of the loss X from an insurer (agent 1 with X1 = 0). In this case, our
problem amounts to finding a Pareto optimal allocation (f ∗(X), X−f ∗(X)), in which f ∗(X)
is the insurer’s share of the risk X, and X − f ∗(X) is the amount of the risk retained by the
individual. Arrow [3] showed that if the premium equals (1 + θ)Ef(X) with θ > 0 and if the
individual seeks to maximize his or her expected utility of wealth, then f ∗(X) is deductible
coverage (that is, f ∗(X) is given functionally by f ∗(x) = (x−d)+ for some d ≥ 0, in which x
is a specific value of the random loss X). One could view this risk exchange as Pareto optimal
if the insurer’s goal were to maximize its expected profits (among other possible criteria).
For more recent work in the area of optimal insurance, see Promislow and Young [29] who
extended the work of Arrow to other premium rules and optimality criteria.
We first examine the case for which 1 + b1 + c1 = 0 = 1 + b2 + c2. Then, we consider the
case for which (1 + b1 + c1)(1 + b2 + c2) > 0.
5.1. 1 + b1 + c1 = 0 = 1 + b2 + c2. In this case, we have c1 = −(1 + b1) and c2 = −(1 + b2). It
follows from arguments similar to those in Section 3 that the Pareto optimal risk exchanges
are given as the minimizers over Y ∈ C(X) of the following expression as λ1 and λ2 range
over the non-negative reals:
λ1(1 + b1) [Hg1(Y1)− EY1] + λ2(1 + b2) [Hg2(Y2)− EY2] , (16)
with at least one of λ1 and λ2 strictly positive. Without loss of generality, suppose λ1 > 0.
Also, note that Y2 = X − Y1; let f(X) denote Y1. Then, the Pareto optimal risk exchanges
are the minimizers over real-valued, continuous, non-decreasing functions f , with Hgi(f(X))
finite for i = 1, 2, of the following expression as δ ranges over the non-negative reals:
[Hg1(f(X))− Ef(X)] + δ [Ef(X)−Hg2(f(X))] . (17)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that f(0) = 0; otherwise, define fˆ by fˆ(x)−f(0)
and note thatHgi(fˆ(X))−Efˆ(X) = Hgi(f(X)−f(0))−E(f(X)−f(0)) = Hgi(f(X))−Ef(X)
for i = 1, 2.
By following the argument of Theorem 3, the derivative of the optimal function f ∗ is given
by
(f ∗)′(t) =

1, if g1(SX(t))− SX(t) < δ [g2(SX(t))− SX(t)] ;
β, if g1(SX(t))− SX(t) = δ [g2(SX(t))− SX(t)] ;
0, otherwise,
(18)
in which β ∈ [0, 1] is arbitrary. If we interpret g(SX(t)) − SX(t) as the marginal cost of
adding more risk (except for the factor of 1 + b), then f ∗ increases if the marginal cost for
the insurer is less than the marginal cost for the buyer adjusted by the factor δ ≥ 0.
Note that if 0 ≤ δ1 < δ2, then f ∗δ1 ≤ f ∗δ2 , in which f ∗δi corresponds to the minimizer of (17)
for δ = δi, i = 1, 2. In other words, as the weight given to buyer’s risk preference increases,
then the insurer assumes more of the risk.
In the special case for which δ = 0, we seek to minimize Hg1(f(X)) − Ef(X) which is
greater than or equal to 0 because g1 is concave. Thus, Hg1(f(X)) − Ef(X) is minimized
by f ∗ ≡ r for any constant r. If g1 is strictly concave, then this expression is minimized
uniquely (up to an additive constant) by f ∗ ≡ 0. If g1 is not strictly concave, then for
OPTIMAL RISK SHARING UNDER DISTORTED PROBABILITIES 12
illustrative purposes, suppose g1 is given by AVaR, specifically g1(p) = min(αp, 1) for some
α > 1. Then, for X ∼ Bernoulli(q) for some q > 1/α, the function f given by f(0) = r and
f(1) = r+ 1 is such that Hg1(f(X))−Ef(X) = 0 for any r ∈ R. That is, if g1 is not strictly
concave, then the minimizer of Hg1(f(X))− Ef(X) is not necessarily unique.
In general, if the distortions are not strictly concave, then it is possible that g1(SX(t))−
SX(t) = δ [g2(SX(t))− SX(t)] on a set of positive measure, in which case, f ∗ will not be
unique.
We leave the case for which 1 + b1 + c1 = 0 = 1 + b2 + c2 because as the reader will see in
the next section, the conclusions that we could draw further from equation (18) are similar
to the ones we will draw from equation (21) below.
5.2. (1+b1+c1)(1+b2+c2) > 0. Let f(X) be the random indemnity that the insurer (agent
1) pays to the buyer (agent 2) in exchange for a premium of (1 + θ)Ef(X) for some θ > 0,
with f(X) and X − f(X) comonotone.
For concreteness, in the notation of this paper, set a1 = 0, b1 > 0, c1 = −(1 + θ) and
a2 = (1 + θ)EX, b2 = 0, c2 = −(1 + θ). Thus, the condition (1 + b1 + c1)(1 + b2 + c2) > 0 is
equivalent to b1 < θ.
Under these values for the parameters, the rationality constraint for the insurer in (8)
becomes
(1 + θ)Ef(X) ≥ (1 + b1)Hg1(f(X)); (19)
that is, the insurer is willing to enter into a contract for which the premium (1 + θ)Ef(X) is
at least as great as the risk-adjusted cost, as measured by (1+b1)Hg1(f(X)). The rationality
constraint for the buyer becomes
Hg2(f(X)) ≥ (1 + θ)Ef(X); (20)
that is, the risk-adjusted benefit for the buyer from receiving f(X) is greater than the cost
(1 + θ)Ef(X).
It is reasonable to assume that the buyer is “more risk averse” than the insurer in the
sense that the buyer’s distortion function is a concave transformation of the insurer’s, or
equivalently, g2 ≥ g1. Theorem 3 then implies that the optimal function f ∗ is given by
(f ∗)′(t) =

1, if g1(SX(t))− SX(t) < θ−b1θ(1+b1) [g2(SX(t))− SX(t)] ;
β, if g1(SX(t))− SX(t) = θ−b1θ(1+b1) [g2(SX(t))− SX(t)] ;
0, otherwise.
(21)
in which β ∈ [0, 1] is arbitrary. The function f ∗ in equation (21) is similar in form to the one
given in (18), with the arbitrary δ ≥ 0 replaced by the fixed 0 < (θ − b1)/(θ(1 + b1)) < 1.
From the expression in (21), we can deduce several conclusions. Because (θ−b1)/θ increases
as θ increases, the optimal insurance f ∗ increases as the proportional risk loading θ increases.
Also, because (θ−b1)/(1+b1) decreases as b1 < θ increases, the optimal insurance f ∗ decreases
as the insurer’s cost b1 increases. This makes sense because if the proportional cost of the
insurer increases, as measured by b1, then the insurer is willing to sell less insurance to the
buyer.
If g2 is replaced by a concave distortion gˆ2 ≥ g2, then f ∗ increases because g2(SX(t))−SX(t)
increases. In other words, as the buyer of insurance becomes more risk averse, then the buyer
is willing to purchase more insurance at a given price.
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We have the following proposition that tells us when the optimal insurance is deductible
insurance. We omit its proof because it is a straightforward application of the expression in
(21). Recall from the discussion following Lemma 2 that without loss of generality, we can
assume that f ∗(0) = 0, and we do so in this proposition.
Proposition 1. If (g1(p)− p)/(g2(p)− p) increases for p ∈ (0, 1), then deductible insurance
is optimal, that is,
f ∗(x) = (x− d)+ (22)
is optimal with the deductible d given by
d = inf
{
t :
g1(SX(t))− SX(t)
g2(SX(t))− SX(t) ≤
θ − b1
θ(1 + b1)
}
. (23)
If no such d exists, then f ∗ ≡ 0.
Note that if (g1(p)−p)/(g2(p)−p) increases for p ∈ (0, 1), then (g1(SX(t))−SX(t))/(g2(SX(t))−
SX(t)) decreases for t ≥ 0.
Proposition 1 is a generalization of Proposition 3.2 in Jouini et al. [25] who also obtained
deductible insurance in the context of law-invariant convex risk measures. In contrast to
the proof presented here, their non-constructive method relies on convex duality and only
applies in the setting of L∞(P).
We have three corollaries to Proposition 1 for special cases of distortion functions. First,
we consider the proportional hazards transform; then, we consider AVaR; finally, we consider
the dual power distortion. We omit their proofs because they follow directly from showing
that (g1(p)− p)/(g2(p)− p) increases on (0, 1).
Corollary 1. If gi(p) = p
ci for 0 < c2 < c1 < 1, then deductible insurance is optimal.
Moreover, for the proportional hazards transform, (g1(p)−p)/(g2(p)−p) increases from 0 to
(1− c1)/(1− c2) < 1. Therefore, if (1− c1)/(1− c2) < (θ− b1)/(θ(1 + b1)) then full coverage
is optimal, which occurs when b1 is small enough. However, if θ is large, then the rationality
constraint in inequality (20) might not hold, so full coverage (even though optimal) might
not be feasible. In such cases, we can subtract a fixed amount a > 0 from the coverage
to make it feasible by the buyer, thereby effectively lowering the benefit and the premium.
Finally, note that as c2 decreases (that is, as the buyer becomes more risk averse), the ratio
(g1(SX(t))− SX(t))/(g2(SX(t))− SX(t)) decreases for a given value of t ≥ 0, which implies
that the deductible decreases (that is, the optimal coverage increases).
Corollary 2. If gi(p) = min(αip, 1) for 1 < α1 < α2, then deductible insurance is optimal.
For the AVaR distortion, (g1(p) − p)/(g2(p) − p) increases from (α1 − 1)/(α2 − 1) to 1. If
(α1 − 1)/(α2 − 1) > (θ − b1)/(θ(1 + b1)), then zero coverage is optimal. If b1 > 0 and if
SX(0) = 1, then full coverage is never optimal.
Corollary 3. If gi(p) = 1− (1− p)di for 1 < d1 < d2, then deductible insurance is optimal.
The dual power distortion is so named because it is the dual to the proportional hazards
transform. For this distortion, (g1(p)− p)/(g2(p)− p) increases from (d1− 1)/(d2− 1) to ∞.
Thus, if (d1− 1)/(d2− 1) > (θ− b1)/(θ(1 + b1)), then zero coverage is optimal. If SX(0) = 1,
then full coverage is never optimal.
We end this section with two examples in which we show that deductible coverage as
defined in the narrow sense of equation (22) is not necessarily optimal.
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Example 1. Define the distortions g1 and g2 on [0, 1] by
g1(p) =
{
9
8
p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2
,
7
8
p+ 1
8
, 1
2
< p ≤ 1; (24)
and
g2(p) =

4
3
p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
4
,
p+ 1
12
, 1
4
< p ≤ 3
4
,
2
3
p+ 1
3
, 3
4
< p ≤ 1.
(25)
If X ∼ Exp(1), θ = 1, and b1 = 1/3, then one can show that optimal insurance f ∗1 satisfies
(f ∗1 )
′(t) =

1, 0 ≤ t < ln 3
2
,
0, ln 3
2
≤ t < ln 3,
1, t ≥ ln 3.
(26)
In other words, optimal insurance f ∗1 exhibits full coverage up to ln(3/2) followed by no
additional coverage until ln 3, after which the coverage is full at the margin. Specifically, f ∗1
is given by
(f ∗1 )(t) =

t, 0 ≤ t < ln 3
2
,
ln 3
2
, ln 3
2
≤ t < ln 3,
t+ ln 1
2
, t ≥ ln 3.
(27)
Example 2. Define the distortions g1 and g2 on [0, 1] by
g1(p) =

4
3
p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
4
,
p+ 1
12
, 1
4
< p ≤ 3
4
,
2
3
p+ 1
3
, 3
4
< p ≤ 1.
(28)
and
g2(p) =
{
3
2
p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2
,
1
2
p+ 1
2
, 1
2
< p ≤ 1; (29)
If X ∼ Exp(1), θ = 1, and b1 = 1/3, then one can show that the optimal insurance f ∗ paid
by the insurer is given by f ∗(t) = t− f ∗1 (t) for t ≥ 0, in which f ∗1 is the optimal insurance in
Example 1. In other words, optimal insurance in this case exhibits a deductible of ln(3/2)
with a maximum limit, or maximum payout, of ln 2.
5.3. Examples with Constraints. Regulators of insurance often put constraints on insur-
ance contracts that insurers are allowed to provide in the market. To illustrate the effect
of constraints on the form of the indemnity contract f , we include two simple examples.
In both these examples, we follow the model for two agents with b1 > 0, b2 = 0, and
c1 = c2 = −(1 + θ). Let 
g1(p) = min(α1p, 1),
g2(p) = min(α2p, 1),
h1(p) = min(βp, 1).
Agent 1 is the insurer with the AVaR distortion function g1 that faces a regulator constraint
based on the Hh1 risk measure; agent 2 is the buyer with the AVaR distortion function g2.
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Example 3. In this example, suppose that α2 > β > α1 > 1; that is, the buyer is the
most risk averse with the insurer being the least risk averse and the regulator somewhere in
between. The relevant terms in the sum (15) are given by{
Q1(p) = [(1 + b1) min(α1p, 1)− (1 + θ)p+ λmin(βp, 1)]/|b1 + λ− θ|
Q2(p) = [min(α2p, 1)− (1 + θ)p]/θ. (30)
By Theorem 4, for a given Lagrange multiplier λ ≥ 0, the optimal contract satisfies (fλ)′(SX(t)) =
1 if Q1(p) < Q2(p) and (f
λ)′(SX(t)) = 0 otherwise.
In the following, we assume that θ > λ + b1, so the transaction costs are large. The risk
functions Q1 and Q2 are illustrated in Figure 1. We note that for large p ∼ 1, Q1(p) ≥ Q2(p)
and moreover, the two piecewise linear functions cross at most once on (0, 1). More precisely,
if α2 > (1+θ)+
[(1+b1)α1−(1+θ)+λβ]θ
θ−b1−λ , then for small p ∼ 0, Q1(p) < Q2(p), and Q1 and Q2 have
exactly one crossing point 0 < p∗ < 1. Thus, the optimal contract in that case is deductible
insurance fλ(x) = (x−d)+, as the insurer covers large risks (small p) and the buyer takes on
small risks. If α2 is smaller than the above threshold, then Q1(p) > Q2(p) for all p ∈ (0, 1),
and it is optimal to have zero insurance fλ ≡ 0 (note that zero insurance implies λ = 0 as
the constraint is necessarily non-binding).
The two (finite) possibilities for the deductible level d (with SX(d) corresponding to the
unique crossing point of Q1 and Q2) are illustrated in Figure 1. The left panel of Figure 1
shows Case (a), whereby
SX(d) = p
∗
2 =
λ(1 + θ)− θ + b1
(1 + θ)(b1 + λ)− (1 + b1)α1θ . (31)
The necessary and sufficient condition for Case (a) to occur is 1/β < p∗2 < 1/α1, which is
equivalent to
−b1 < λ < min
(
θ − b1, (θ − b1)β + (1 + θ)b1 − (1 + b1)α1θ
(1 + θ)(β − 1)
)
.
It is possible that the upper bound is negative which implies that case (a) cannot occur as
λ is non-negative by construction.
Otherwise, we are in Case (b) shown on the right panel of Figure 1, where
SX(d) = p
∗
1 =
θ − (b1 + λ)
θ(1 + b1)α1 − b1(1 + θ) + λ[θβ − (1 + θ)] . (32)
Case (b) requires that 1/α2 < p
∗
1 < 1/β, or
b1(1 + θ)− θ(1 + b1)α1 + (θ − b1)β
(β − 1)(1 + θ) < λ <
b1(1 + θ)− θ(1 + b1)α1 + (θ − b1)α2
(α2 − 1) + θ(β − 1) .
Example 4. We keep the above notation but now suppose that β > α2 > α1 > 1; that is, the
regulator is the most risk averse, the buyer is moderately risk averse, and again, the insurer
is the least risk averse.
Let λ ≥ 0 be a Lagrange multiplier for this problem. We continue to assume θ > b1 + λ.
The risk functions to compare are the same as in (30) but their relation has changed, as
illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 1. In particular, it is now possible that Q1 and Q2
cross twice in the interior of (0, 1), so that the optimal contract may be a capped deductible.
Specifically, in the latter case
fλ(x) = (x− d1)+ ∧ d2, where d2 = S−1X (p∗2)
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from (31) and
d1 = S
−1
X
(
λθ
(1 + θ)(b1 + λ)− (1 + b1)α1θ + α2(θ − b1 − λ)
)
,
subject to the feasibility constraints 1/β < SX(d1) < 1/α2 and 1/α2 < SX(d2) < 1/α1.
Translating these into constraints for λ we find that
max
(
−b1, (1 + θ)b1
βθ + α2 − (1 + θ)
)
< λ < min
(
θ − b1, (1 + θ)b1
α2(1 + θ)− (1 + θ)
)
.
This situation is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 1. Note that because α2 > α1, if
there were no constraints, then the optimal insurance would be deductible insurance.
Note that with such a contract, the regulator’s risk level takes the form Hh1(f
λ(X)) =
SX(d2)−SX(d1) (since 1/β < SX(d1) < SX(d2)). For instance, taking α1 = 1.1, α2 = 1.5, β =
2, θ = 1.2, b1 = 0.3, and λ = 0.18, we obtain SX(d1) = 0.5143 and SX(d2) = 0.7636, so that
the insurer only covers the 23− 48th percentiles of the risk. Since the constraint is binding,
B = Hh1(f
λ(X)) = 0.249, and looking back we can interpret this as saying that the insurer
is allowed to cover at most 24.9% of the risk. Observe that even though the regulator is
having a lot of impact on the optimal contract (the constraint is binding), the risk aversion
of the insurer himself α1 still plays a role in the shape of the insurance contract.
6. Minimizing the Risk of the Buyer subject to a Constraint
To further explore the implications of constrained risk sharing, we consider a slightly
different example in which the buyer is the only minimizing agent. This is the usual insurance
setting whereby the insurer offers a menu of contracts and the buyer selects the one most
suited to her needs. Thus, the optimization is from the buyer’s point of view; the insurer’s
risk preferences enter the problem through the insurance price.
Assume that the buyer’s risk-adjusted loss after obtaining insurance is (1 + b)Hg(X −
f(X)) + (1 + θ)Ef(X), in which the first term represents the residual risk and the second
term represents the insurance premium. The insurer himself is constrained by regulators to
Hh(f(X)) ≤ B, so that only a limited amount of risk may be transferred. We ignore the
desires of the insurer and focus on minimizing the risk-adjusted loss of the buyer subject to
this constraint. Then, we seek to find a non-decreasing f ∗ that minimizes
(1 + b)Hg(X − f(X)) + (1 + θ)Ef(X), (33)
subject to the regulatory constraint
Hh(f(X)) ≤ B, (34)
for some B > 0. The following proposition is a direct counterpart of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. An insurance contract f ∗ that minimizes (33) subject to (34) is determined by
(f ∗)′(t) =
{
1, if (1 + b)g(SX(t)) > (1 + θ)SX(t) + λh(SX(t)),
0, if (1 + b)g(SX(t)) ≤ (1 + θ)SX(t) + λh(SX(t)). (35)
Furthermore, either λ = 0 or λ > 0, with the latter implying that (34) holds with equality,
from which we can determine λ.
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Figure 1. Risk functions of Examples 3 and 4. The dashed line represents
Q1(p) = [(1 + b1) min(α1p, 1) − (1 + θ)p + λmin(βp, 1)]/|b1 + λ − θ|, and the
solid line is Q2(p) = [min(α2p, 1)− (1 + θ)p]/θ. In this example, θ > λ+ b1, so
we have Q1(1) = Q2(1) = −1. Note that both functions are piecewise linear.
The crossing points correspond to the tranche levels of optimal contracts. The
top two panels are for Example 3 (Case (a) on the left, Case (b) on the right),
and the bottom panel is for Example 4.
Proof. Fix λ ≥ 0. Proceeding as in (13), we have
(1 + b)Hg(X − fλ(X)) + (1 + θ)EY + λ(Hh(fλ(X))−B)
=
∫ ∞
0
[−(1 + b)g + (1 + θ) + λh](SX(t)) dfλ(t) + Const.
Thus, to minimize (33) we should set (fλ)′(t) = 0 when the integrand is positive, and
f ′(t) = 1 when the integrand is negative, which is equivalent to (35). To find λ, we solve for
λ
∫∞
0
h(SX(t)) df
λ(t) = B.  
To be concrete, take g(p) = min(α p, 1) and h(p) = min(β p, 1), in which α > β > 1 so that
the buyer is more risk averse than the regulator. Also, suppose the loss X is exponentially
distributed with mean equal to 1/µ. Then, for a given Lagrange multiplier λ ≥ 0, we find
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fλ to minimize ∫ 1
µ
lnβ
0
[−(1 + b)eµt + λeµt + (1 + θ)] e−µt df(t)
+
∫ 1
µ
lnα
1
µ
lnβ
[−(1 + b)eµt + λβ + (1 + θ)] e−µt df(t) (36)
+
∫ ∞
1
µ
lnα
[−(1 + b)α + λβ + (1 + θ)]e−µt df(t).
From (36), we consider the following cases:
Case 1: If −(1 + b) + λ + (1 + θ) = λ + θ − b ≤ 0, then all the integrands in (36) are
negative, which implies that fλ(x) = x. If B ≥ (1 + ln β)/µ = Hh(X), the constraint is not
binding, and full insurance fλ is optimal. Else, if B < Hh(X), then the constraint binds.
which implies that full insurance cannot be optimal.
Case 2: If λ+ θ − b > 0 and −(1 + b)β + λβ + (1 + θ) ≤ 0, that is,
b− θ < λ ≤ (1 + b)− (1 + θ)/β, (37)
then fλ(x) = (x−d)+ for some deductible d ∈ [0, (ln β)/µ]. Specifically, d = (1/µ) ln
(
1+θ
1+b−λ
)
.
In this case, we have Hh((X − d)+) = (1 + ln β)/µ− d. We have two subcases to consider.
a: If µB ≥ 1 + ln
(
β(1+b)
1+θ
)
, then the constraint does not bind (that is, λ = 0), which
implies that d = (1/µ) ln
(
1+θ
1+b
)
> 1/µ. For this to happen, we also need to satisfy
(37) which reduces to 0 + θ − b > 0 and −(1 + b)β + (1 + θ) ≤ 0, or equivalently,
b < θ ≤ (1 + b)β − 1.
b: Else, if µB < 1+ln
(
β(1+b)
1+θ
)
, then the constraint binds, and we have λ > 0. Specifically
λ = (1 + b) − 1+θ
β
eµB−1. To satisfy (37), we need µB ≥ 1 and µB < 1 + ln β. Recall
that µB < 1 + ln
(
β(1+b)
1+θ
)
in this case; by comparing the latter two upper bounds on
µB, we find that Case 2b occurs if (2b1) θ ≤ b and 1 ≤ µB < 1+ln β; or if (2b2) θ > b
and 1 ≤ µB < 1 + ln
(
β(1+b)
1+θ
)
. Finally, d = −B + (1 + ln β)/µ > 0 in either situation.
Case 3: If λ+ θ − b > 0, −(1 + b)β + λβ + (1 + θ) > 0, and −(1 + b)α+ λβ + (1 + θ) < 0,
that is,
b− θ < λ and (1 + b)β − (1 + θ) < λβ < (1 + b)α− (1 + θ), (38)
then fλ(x) = (x − d)+ for some deductible d ∈ [(ln β)/µ, (lnα)/µ]. Specifically, d =
(1/µ) ln
(
λβ+(1+θ)
1+b
)
. In this case, we have Hh((X − d)+) = βe−µd/µ = β(1+b)µ(λβ+(1+θ)) . We
have two subcases to consider.
a: If µB ≥ β(1+b)
1+θ
, then the constraint does not bind, and we have λ = 0 and d =
(1/µ) ln
(
1+θ
1+b
)
. To satisfy (38), we require b < θ and β(1 + b) < (1 + θ) < α(1 + b).
Summarizing, Case 3a occurs if b < θ, β(1+b)−1 < θ < α(1+b)−1, and µB ≥ β(1+b)
1+θ
.
b: If µB < β(1+b)
1+θ
, then the constraint binds, and we have λ = 1+b
µB
− 1+θ
β
and d =
(1/µ) ln
(
β
µB
)
. To satisfy (38), we require β/α < µB < 1 and µB ((b− θ)β + (1 + θ)) <
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(1 + b)β. By considering possible values of θ and comparing with the above bounds,
we find that Case 3b occurs when
θ ≤ (1 + b)β − 1, and β/α < µB < 1; or
(1 + b)β − 1 < θ < (1 + b)α− 1, and β/α < µB < (1 + b)β
1 + θ
.
Case 4: If −(1+b)α+λβ+(1+θ) = 0, then λ = ((1+b)α−(1+θ))/β, from which it follows
that λ + θ − b > 0 and −(1 + b)β + λβ + (1 + θ) > 0. Thus, the first two integrals in (36)
are positive, which implies that (fλ)′(t) = 0 for t ≤ (lnα)/µ. Moreover, the third integral is
identically zero, so we have infinitely many possible solutions fλ. This degeneracy arises due
to the piecewise linear form of the AVaR distortions we selected. Within this framework, we
have two subcases to consider.
a: If θ = (1 + b)α− 1, then λ = 0, and the constraint does not bind necessarily. Thus, fλ
is given by (fλ)′(t) = 0 for t ≤ (lnα)/µ and arbitrary (fλ)′(t) ∈ [0, 1] for t > (lnα)/µ
such that Hh(f
λ(X)) ≤ B.
b: If θ < (1 + b)α − 1, then λ > 0, and the constraint binds. Thus, fλ is given by
(fλ)′(t) = 0 for t < (lnα)/µ and arbitrary (fλ)′(t) ∈ [0, 1] for t ≥ (lnα)/µ such that
Hh(f
λ(X)) = B. We give some examples to illustrate possible indemnity functions fλ:
i: Let fλ(x) = (x − d)+ with deductible d = (1/µ) ln
(
β
µB
)
. Note that d ≥ (lnα)/µ
if and only if µB ≤ β/α.
ii: Let fλ(x) = r(x − (lnα)/µ)+ with proportional coverage r = µBα/β. Note that
r ∈ [0, 1] if and only if µB ≤ β/α.
iii: Let fλ(x) = min (r′(x− d′)+, m− d′) with d′ and r′ given such that d′ ≥ (lnα)/µ
and µBeµd
′
/β < r′ ≤ 1, from which it follows that m = (1/µ) ln
(
βr′eµd
′
βr′−µBeµd′
)
> d′.
Case 5: If λ + θ − b > 0 and −(1 + b)α + λβ + (1 + θ) > 0, then fλ ≡ 0 because all three
integrals in (36) are positive. In this case, the constraint does not bind, and we necessarily
have λ = 0. Thus, if θ > (1 + b)α − 1, then f ∗ = fλ ≡ 0 is optimal; that is, any amount of
insurance is too expensive relative to the benefit that the buyer obtains from it.
See Table 1 for a summary of these results as a function of the risk loading parameter θ
and regulator’s constraint B.
7. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we proved that (Pareto) optimal risk sharing contracts take the form of
deductible insurance in the setting of agents endowed with distortion risk measures and linear
transaction/premium costs. Such results continue to hold under third-party constraints. This
conforms to real-life insurance contracts both in a two-agent case (for example, casualty
reinsurance) and in a multi-agent setting (credit derivatives based on tranches).
It would be interesting to extend our results to more general setting, in particular indiffer-
ence measures based on Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU, also known as Maximin
Expected Utility and Savage preferences). A tractable example is the exponential-distortion
risk measure, see [35]:
H(X) =
1
γ
ln
{∫ 0
−∞
(g[SeγY (t)]− 1) dt+
∫ ∞
0
g[SeγY (t)] dt
}
. (39)
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θ > (1 + b)α− 1
B > 0 Case 5 d = +∞ λ = 0
θ = (1 + b)α− 1
B > 0 Case 4a non-unique optimum λ = 0
(1 + b)β − 1 ≤ θ < (1 + b)α− 1
µB ≤ β/α Case 4b non-unique optimum λ = ((1 + b)α− (1 + θ))/β
β/α < µB < (1+b)β
1+θ
Case 3b d = (1/µ) ln
(
β
µB
)
λ = 1+b
µB
− 1+θ
β
> 0
µB ≥ (1+b)β
1+θ
Case 3a d = (1/µ) ln
(
1+θ
1+b
)
λ = 0
b < θ < (1 + b)β − 1
µB ≤ β/α Case 4b non-unique optimum λ = ((1 + b)α− (1 + θ))/β
β/α < µB < 1 Case 3b d = (1/µ) ln
(
β
µB
)
λ = 1+b
µB
− 1+θ
β
> 0
1 ≤ µB < 1 + ln(β(1+b)
1+θ
) Case 2b2 d = −B + 1+lnβ
µ
λ = (1 + b)− 1+θ
β
eµB−1
µB ≥ 1 + ln
(
β(1+b)
1+θ
)
Case 2a d = 1/µ ln
(
1+θ
1+b
)
λ = 0
θ ≤ b
µB ≤ β/α Case 4 non-unique optimum λ = ((1 + b)α− (1 + θ))/β
β/α < µB < 1 Case 3b d = (1/µ) ln
(
β
µB
)
λ = 1+b
µB
− 1+θ
β
> 0
1 ≤ µB < 1 + ln β Case 2b1 d = −B + 1+lnβ
µ
λ = (1 + b)− 1+θ
β
eµB−1
µB ≥ 1 + ln β Case 1 d = 0 λ = 0
Table 1. Classification of Pareto optimal allocations of example in Section 6.
Note that H is similar to (4) but also features the exponential utility u(x) = −e−γx. The
preferences induced by H can be seen in the context of robust utility, where the parameter
γ is interpreted as the risk aversion coefficient, while the distortion function g corresponds
to ambiguity-aversion.
One can show that H is a law-invariant, convex risk measure. However, compared to our
model, H is no longer coherent or comonotone additive. Nevertheless, by Remark 4 our
analysis up to Theorem 3 still applies. However, because the non-linear log-transformation
in (39) is global, the structure of Theorem 3 does not hold because we can no longer perform
t-by-t optimization for the optimal risk allocation f .
From a general viewpoint, our work confirms previous results of Jouini et al. [25] (and
originally Arrow [3]) on optimality of deductible insurance. Conversely, it contrasts with
possibility of proportional risk sharing obtained in Barrieu and El Karoui [4] (and originally
Borch [7]). The key step in our method relies on comonotonicity of Pareto optimal allocations
due to the consistency of preferences with the stochastic convex order ≤cx. Thus, we raise
the conjecture that in the setting of law-invariant convex risk measures, optimal risk sharing
always leads to insurance that incorporates a ladder of deductibles (both in unconstrained
and constrained settings).
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